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ANNEX B

NUCLEAR CONTAINMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

June 13, 1963

PURPOSE

To set forth an approach to clarification of the U.S. position on the further spread of nuclear weapons.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the U.S. should on an appropriate occasion issue a major policy statement supporting specific steps directed against the further spread of nuclear weapons, as outlined in part B of the discussion section below.

2. That the Harriman mission might be authorized to undertake private advance approaches to the Soviets in an effort to obtain their cooperation in respect to certain of these proposed steps.

DISCUSSION

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. As viewed in this paper, the problem of "the further spread of nuclear weapons" is taken literally as encompassing not only the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional countries (with or without assistance from the present nuclear powers) but also the emplacement of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear areas by countries possessing such weapons.

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DECLASSIFIED BY/RELEASE AUTHORITY:
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELEASE DECISION: RELEASE IN FULL
DATE: DECEMBER 17, 2019

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-2-

2. Unless the present nuclear powers relinquish nuclear weapons to additional countries (a possibility considered here to be remote at the present time), the number of countries having both the incentive and the potential capability of acquiring nuclear weapons in the relatively near future is low. However, it is precisely those countries which have both incentive and some prospective capability that are least likely to accede to arms control proposals. This is not to say that arms control approaches would be without value. At the minimum, they can help focus attention on the problem where it exists, and particularly if the major nuclear powers are themselves prepared to accept limitations on their own activities, pressures can perhaps be brought more effectively to bear. Beyond this, some types of arms control arrangements might serve to make the task of would-be nuclear powers somewhat more difficult by, for example, limiting possible sources of assistance and supply.

3. The second aspect of the problem -- that of the emplacement of nuclear weapons in additional areas by countries now possessing such weapons -- has achieved a new significance from the standpoint of U.S. security interests in the light of recent developments.

a. The Cuban crisis of the fall of 1962 indicated an unexpected degree of Soviet readiness to exercise a kind

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-3-

of flexibility with which the U.S. had not previously been confronted. It is problematical whether the Soviet Union would at a future time seek to exploit in a similar way additional opportunities which may arise. Nonetheless, for both countries -- and for the rest of the world -- the Soviet adventure led to a dangerous nuclear confrontation of a type that might best not be repeated elsewhere. In this regard, arms control proposals are, realistically, less directed toward forestalling similar situations (even "agreed" arrangements could not be assumed to provide an effective barrier to such adventures if sufficiently attractive opportunities should again arise) than toward creating a presumption against them and, at the minimum, signalling the desire of the U.S. itself to avoid direct nuclear confrontation wherever possible.

b. A more immediate reason for considering the question of the emplacement of nuclear weapons in additional areas arises from the apparently increasing interest in the concept of the "denuclearized zone". Such interest is probably as much "escapist" as "neutralist" in its overtones and reflects the not unreasonable desire of a number of countries in the developing areas to opt out of the nuclear arms race and, hopefully, out of a future nuclear war. Although the U.S. would not be prepared to accept or encourage

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-4-

such zones in areas where nuclear weapons already form an integral part of existing security arrangements or where arms confrontations are too complex to be resolved by measures addressed to nuclear weapons alone, it may be in the U.S. interest to display a friendly disposition toward such zones in some of the developing areas in order to influence terms and arrangements along desired lines. Indeed, the U.S. should thus be in a better position to protect its important specific interests (including transit rights and non-nuclear installations) and its general influence with the countries concerned, than if it adopted a passive or adverse attitude.

4. The deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space is considered here as a special case. There may be advantages in dealing with this problem in the context of steps to limit "the further spread of nuclear weapons" as opposed to considering it as an "outer space" problem. The latter approach might lend itself more readily to efforts to question other types of space activities.

5. The approach outlined below does not reflect a comprehensive examination of the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons or of effective means of dealing with it. For the most part, the approach builds on present U.S. positions. In this connection, basic difficulties not faced in this paper include the implications of the U.S. effort to establish an

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-5-

MLF and the increased problems thereby incurred in arriving at an agreed approach with the Soviet Union on non-proliferation. Nor is consideration given to the question of what pressures might really be brought to bear on Communist China if the U.S. and Soviet Union desired and were able to concert their efforts in this regard.

B. SUGGESTED APPROACH

1. General approach. The general approach suggested here reflects the view that it would be useful for the U.S. to enunciate more clearly a series of steps which might place some limits on the further spread of nuclear weapons. The steps suggested below are primarily unilateral in character although all are, in greater or lesser degree, contingent on the observance of a similar course by other nuclear powers; indeed, in some cases, agreement might be suggested if not actively sought. Each of the steps could be put forward separately; however, since no single one would have especially great impact and since it may be desirable to relate each to the other, the preferred approach might be to incorporate the steps in a major policy statement, possible by the President on the occasion of the next session of the General Assembly. Advance private discussion of the approach with the Soviet Union might be useful. In this connection, it should be noted that a final approach could

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-6-

not be developed until the forthcoming tri-partite talks on the nuclear test issue have taken place.

2. Nuclear tests. The initial focus of such a statement would be on the nuclear test issue and would reflect the outcome of the tri-partite talks. If these talks should result in progress toward an agreement, the U.S. might stress the importance of the adherence of all countries and the desirability of additional efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. If progress is not made through the high-level talks, the U.S. might reaffirm its determination to continue efforts in this regard and express its intention, contingent in part on the conduct of other countries, to refrain from the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The U.S. would welcome a similar declaration of purpose by other states. Attention would then be called to additional steps which the U.S., for its own part, would be willing to undertake.*

* Not included here is the proposal for an agreed cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons and the transfer of agreed quantities of materials to uses other than use in nuclear weapons. This proposal has been publicly and privately rejected by the Soviet Union. However, should no progress have been made toward a nuclear test ban, consideration might be given to the public relations value of including this proposal together with the others listed.

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-7-

3. Non-transfer.

a. The U.S. might first state its own approach to the problem. In this regard, it could be made clear that, for its own part, the U.S. will not give impetus to further extension of the nuclear arms race by transferring any nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, to states not now possessing them or by assisting such other states in the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons. This policy would continue in effect so long as other nuclear states refrained from such activities.

b. The statement might note that in the event that additional countries should acquire control of nuclear weapons through independent efforts or with assistance, the U.S. would need to consider what steps, consistent with the maintenance of international peace and security, might best ensure the continuing freedom and security of other countries which might thus be threatened.

c. In setting forth its own intentions with respect to these matters, the U.S. should also support an agreement by all countries under which states now possessing nuclear weapons would accept non-transfer obligations and states not now possessing such weapons would express their intention not to seek or acquire them. The desirability of separate statements of intention by all countries might be suggested.

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as an interim measure pending conclusion of a broad agreement.

4. Denuclearized zones.

a. The statement might then note that where nuclear weapons already form an integral part of existing security arrangements, efforts to control the situation must proceed on a broad basis and must take into account all of the questions of military balance involved, not simply those questions related to nuclear weapons. Elsewhere, the degree of difficulty in preventing extension of the nuclear arms race varies, but in at least some cases it ought to be possible to rule out escalation of the arms race to nuclear levels if the countries concerned so desire.

b. The continents of Latin America and Africa could be identified in the statement as evident examples where, if the countries thereof desire to do so, agreements to establish denuclearized zones appeared practical. The U.S. should note its understanding that the effects of such zones would be to preclude the stationing of nuclear weapons and associated delivery vehicles in the participating countries and would also preclude efforts by participating countries to acquire such armaments. Such objectives are clearly relevant from the standpoint of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. A zonal agreement would hopefully include verification arrangements, and provision for recourse to regional bodies or to the U.N. in the event of suspected violations.

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-9-

With respect to these areas, the U.S. should state that although agreement on arrangements has not yet been reached among the countries concerned, the U.S., for its own part, has no intention to station nuclear weapons therein and would be prepared to reach an agreement with the other nuclear powers which would have the effect of ruling these areas out of the nuclear confrontation by assuring that no nuclear power would station or seek to station nuclear weapons there.* Absent such an agreement, the U.S. would still respect the denuclearized status of these areas as long as the other nuclear powers also, in fact, followed a similar course. (This last policy statement might be deferred until all efforts to reach an agreement among the nuclear powers had been exhausted).

c. The statement should then call attention to the fact that the situation in the Middle East is more complex. It is apparent that with respect to a part of this area matters of primary concern from the standpoint of the maintenance of peace and security are identical with matters of similar concern in Western Europe. However, this circumstance would not be a barrier to establishment of a denuclearized zone in other parts of the area should the countries concerned elect to do so. The U.S. could encourage them to move in this

* An escape-clause should rule out circumstances of general war. (By implication, transit rights would not be affected).

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-10-

direction.

d. Beyond the Middle East problems of still greater complexity arise. Soviet nuclear power extends to large reaches of Asia and the Pacific. Moreover, with or without nuclear weapons, Communist China represents a continuing threat to the maintenance of peace and security in the area. Only if Communist China were to participate in a fully verified denuclearized zone and only if it refrained from courses of action inimical to the interests of its neighbors would a denuclearized zone seem feasible in that area. If Communist China were to adhere to such conditions, then nearby countries in South and Southeast Asia, for whom the major threat is Communist China, might elect to give more serious consideration to participating in a denuclearized zone.

5. International arrangements.

a. The U.S. might then note that useful international arrangements are already available to reinforce efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, attention should be called to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The U.S. should encourage support and extension of this system and should point out that Members of the IAEA which wish to make clear that they have no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons can request the application of IAEA safeguards to all of their nuclear activities.

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-11-

b. The U.S. could call for the following specific measures to strengthen the IAEA: (1) the establishment of effective safeguards respecting fuel element fabrication and the reprocessing of irradiated materials; and (2) the registration with the IAEA of all exports of nuclear materials and equipment.* Exports of such materials and equipment without safeguards should be discouraged.

c. A U.N. General Assembly resolution along the above general lines / ^{might be} desirable.

6. Outer space. Finally, the U.S. might state that while efforts are continued to deal with the problem of the further spread of nuclear weapons on the earth and to curb and turn down the arms race in all of its forms, states possessing nuclear weapons should not extend the arms race by placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit. The U.S. might note that it has on previous occasions made clear that, for its own part, it has no intention of precipitating a race for such weapons, which it regards as unnecessary and as increasing the risk of accidental war. The U.S. might invite a similar expression of intentions from the Soviet Union.

* It is assumed that measures currently under consideration to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system in the case of reactors having a power rating of greater than 100 thermal megawatts will have been adopted prior to the suggested statement on non-proliferation. If this is not the case, these measures should be placed at the beginning of the list given here.

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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

NON-NUCLEAR STATES

NUCLEAR POWERS

Possible Actions

Proposed Restraints

Possible Actions

Independent development

Receipt of aid in
development

Receipt of Transferred
weapons

Acceptance of placement

Non
Acquisi-
tion
Agreement
or
Declara-
tion

Nuclear
Free
Zone
(L. A.
and
Africa)

Under-
taking
to
Respect
N.F.Z.
(L. A.
and
Africa)

Non-
Transfer
Agreement
*

Nuclear Test Ban to
Discourage Development

Aid in development

Transfer of weapons
and control

Emplacement of weapons,
retaining control

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U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELEASE DECISION: RELEASE IN FULL
DATE: DECEMBER 17, 2019

* With safeguards for MLF.

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